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Access v Process in Employment Discrimination: Why 
ADR Suits the US But Not the UK 
 
AARON BAKER∗ 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article compares the legal systems for resolving employment discrimination claims in the US 
and the UK, with particular attention to court or tribunal procedures and the use of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques.  The comparison reveals that the US system of bringing 
claims first to the investigative—but non-adjudicative—Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC) and then to the US Federal Courts takes more time and money, but results 
often in higher compensation, than does the UK system involving conciliation by the Advisory, 
Conciliation, and Arbitration Service (ACAS) before resort to the Employment Tribunals.  From 
this difference appears to follow a much greater enthusiasm, even desperation, for ADR in 
employment discrimination in the US than in the UK.  This piece suggests that the UK may not 
need ADR, as the US clearly does, because of different overall approaches and attitudes to 
remediation of employment discrimination in the two countries.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The US and UK both have witnessed a rise, over the last decade, in the amount of 
scholarship and legislation about the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to 
resolve employment disputes. However, when it comes to employment discrimination, 
the growth does not reflect a homogeneous Anglo-American trend. The discourse about 
ADR in employment discrimination in the UK appears to have a flavour all its own, and 
does not necessarily share the strong motivations and varied directions driving the US 
ADR debate.    
This piece looks at what might be learned from the fact that, in these two nations 
with similar substantive employment discrimination protections and dissimilar formal 
systems to enforce them, the popularity of ADR has grown to different degrees, in 
different forms, and for different reasons. The article begins with a comparison of the 
formal systems for resolving employment discrimination disputes in the US and UK. It 
then compares the methods of ADR used or advocated in the two countries, with some 
attention to the efficacy and pervasiveness of the various techniques. It addresses also 
justifications advanced by parties, practitioners, academics, and legislatures for using 
specific types of ADR.   
It will not escape notice that the US occupies more space in this piece than does 
the UK.  This emphasis was not intended. Instead, it results from the fact that the quantity 
and complexity of formal and alternative processes for resolving employment disputes in 
the US exceeds that of the UK. Comparison highlights the elaborate responses of US 
participants to their more burdensome procedures, as against the relative satisfaction of 
UK participants with their speedier and less expensive ones. 
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The article concludes that different ADR preferences not only reflect different 
procedural contexts, but may in fact result from different attitudes about employment 
discrimination prevention, and from a tension between the aims of individual access to 
justice on one hand, and remedial impact through the full process of law on the other. 
Indeed, this comparison implies that the use of private causes of action to deter 
employment discrimination may hamper the ability of those same causes of action to 
provide accessible and satisfying remedies. This leads to some cynicism about whether 
the US and the UK can meaningfully borrow techniques from one another, but the 
comparison nevertheless yields valuable directions for further inquiry into the 
ramifications of these differences in objectives. 
2. SUBSTANTIVE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE US & UK 
Several US federal statutes, taken together, prohibit discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of employment, including pay, on the bases of race, gender, religion, national 
origin, age, and disability.1 Until 1991, these statutes provided for a cause of action in 
which the courts could award back pay and injunctive relief, such as an order to stop 
discriminating, or to reinstate an improperly discharged employee.2 These purely 
equitable remedies did not call for a jury trial.3 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 made 
amendments to several federal anti-discrimination (in employment) statutes such that 
remedies now include compensatory (ie, pain and suffering) damages and punitive 
damages. These damages are capped, but the caps range between $50,000 and $300,000 
each for compensatory and punitive damages depending on the size of the employer.4 
These changes also entitle plaintiffs to demand a jury trial. Today, victims of 
employment discrimination across the US have the right (eventually) to ask a federal jury 
to award as much as $300,000 in pain and suffering damages, and $300,000 in punitive 
damages per claim.  
Almost all of the 50 US states have their own anti-discrimination statutes, many 
of which afford unlimited punitive and compensatory damages. As a practical matter 
most claims under such statutes are litigated through the federal procedure, for reasons 
the explanation of which exceed the scope of this piece. This means that (1) federal 
damages caps often have no effect when the plaintiff joins her federal claim to a claim 
under a state statute without damages caps and (2) one can meaningfully (albeit not 
exhaustively) study employment discrimination law in the US without worrying too 
much about state court and ADR systems. Taking into account state claims litigated in 
the federal system, then, US employment discrimination law proscribes discrimination on 
the bases of race, gender, religion, national origin, age, and disability, and affords the 
plaintiff a federal jury trial, with the potential, in many cases, for unlimited state punitive 
and compensatory damages.   
                                                 
1 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC s 2000e-5 et seq (‘Title VII’); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 USC s 1981; Equal 
Pay Act, 29 USC s 206(d) (‘EPA’); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 USC s 621 et seq (‘ADEA’); Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 42 USC s 12101 et seq (‘ADA’). 
2 2 [1991] US Cong & Adm News 603-682. 
3 Section 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) suits were an exception, as they did allow common law compensatory damages. 
4 42 USC s 1981a. 
Presently UK law forbids employment discrimination on the bases of gender, 
race, national origin, ethnicity, colour, and disability.5 No UK law prohibits age or 
religion (except in Northern Ireland) discrimination in employment, and sexual 
orientation is not protected by UK law, as indeed it is not in the US. Damages can include 
awards for ‘injury to feelings,’ but no punitive or ‘exemplary’ damages; awards are not 
capped, but are generally vastly smaller than those awarded in the US.6 Trials are not 
before juries, a fact that will receive greater attention in later sections. The substantive 
protections, however, otherwise track with those provided under US law. 
One distinction between US and UK application of these protections lies in the 
burden of proof for ‘direct discrimination’ (what the US calls ‘disparate treatment’). In 
the US, making out a prima facie case, showing or implying that an employment decision 
was discriminatory, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to demonstrate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision or lose the case.7 If the defendant 
meets this burden, the plaintiff can win by proving that the articulated reason is a 
‘pretext’ for discrimination. This burden-shifting approach requires the application of a 
carefully balanced, sometimes counter-intuitive evidentiary standard very much different 
from standards of basic industrial fairness or ‘just cause,’ which are commonly used by 
labour arbitrators and employment tribunals. US courts have therefore erected an 
unabashedly legalistic substantive framework, which lends itself to complicated pretrial 
legal arguments and jury instructions. In the UK, although the concept of the prima facie 
case does apply, the making out of such a case without rebuttal allows, but does not 
require, the employment tribunal to infer discrimination.8 The tribunals retain a more 
common-sense approach, reserving for themselves the decision whether they believe 
discrimination occurred or not.   
Recent circumstances have forced UK law to move closer to the US’s more 
legalistic approach. An important part of the employment law community in the UK 
views the current approach as too informal, and inconsistent with the pro-plaintiff 
remedial aims of anti-discrimination law. Although recent reforms of employment 
tribunal procedure have responded to complaints that juridification has eroded the 
original ‘easily accessible, informal, speedy, and inexpensive’ character of the tribunals, 
parties to discrimination cases in particular are more likely to seek legal advice and insist 
on strict application of substantive discrimination law.9  
More significantly, in 1997 the UK opted into the EC ‘Social Chapter,’ as a part 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam.10 On the heels of the UK opt-in, the EC has issued (among 
other measures) two directives addressing (1) race discrimination in employment and 
other contexts11 and (2) employment discrimination on the bases of religion, age, 
                                                 
5 Equal Pay Act 1970 (‘EqPA’); Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (‘SDA’); Race Relations Act 1976 (‘RRA’); Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (‘DDA’). 
6 See, eg, SDA §§ 65-6; DDA § 8.  EqPA § 2(5) does effectively cap damages with a two year limitation on back-pay.  
7 McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green 411 US 792, 802 (1973). 
8 B Heppel, M Cousey, & T Choudhury Equality: a New Framework (Hart Oxford 2000) pp 4.37-4.39 (‘Equality’).  
9 Equality (n 8 above) p 4.39; JK MacMillan ‘Employment Tribunals: Philosophies and Practicalities’ 28 Ind L J 33, 34-40 
(2000) (‘MacMillan’); see also Anya v University of Oxford and Another [2001] IRLR 377 (the Court of Appeals admonished 
employment tribunals to base decisions on detailed factual findings appropriate to the need of claimants to construct a 
circumstantial discrimination case). 
10 Catherine Barnard EC Employment Law (OUP Oxford 2000) 1-20.   
11 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, ‘implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective 
of racial or ethnic origin’ (‘Race Directive’). 
disability, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.12 These directives require that the UK adopt, 
by 2003, legislation protecting against specific grounds of discrimination. The 
Employment Directive requires that the UK introduce new prohibitions relating to age, 
religion, and sexual orientation. Another significant change heralded by both directives is 
the requirement, in Article 8 of the Race Directive and Article 10 of the Employment 
Directive, that a court or ‘other competent authority’ deciding a discrimination case 
employ a legalistic burden-shifting approach.13 Indeed, the 1997 EC Burden of Proof 
Directive (97/80/EC) already imposed this requirement for gender discrimination cases, 
leading to the Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) 
Regulations 2001. These regulations require tribunals to find for the claimant if a 
defendant cannot disprove the prima facie case, and they formalize the legal concept of 
indirect discrimination (known in the US as disparate impact). Similar implementation of 
the Race and Employment directives will ensure that the UK not only experiences an 
increased caseload, but treats all forms of employment discrimination with a level of 
formality perhaps exceeding that of the US.14 
3. THE US PROCEDURAL SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
While substantive employment discrimination laws in the US and UK share basic 
features and scope, the US and UK systems are not at all similar procedurally. The most 
that can be said by way of similarity is that both systems are at base adversarial, although 
even that similarity can be misleading. The fundamental distinction lies between a system 
of specialized tribunals for employment cases and a system of federal courts with general 
jurisdiction, that hear employment discrimination cases among a vast array of other 
unrelated matters. 
Long before they reach federal court, however, all US employment discrimination 
cases begin with a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(‘EEOC’); this is a mandatory prerequisite to a lawsuit, and is a different process 
altogether from the lawsuit itself.15 Any person who would complain formally of 
employment discrimination must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the 
alleged act.16 The EEOC then has exclusive jurisdiction of the claim for 180 days, during 
which time it purportedly investigates the claim. After this period the claimant can 
request that the EEOC cease its investigation, or can wait until the investigation bears 
fruit. If the claimant requests an end to the investigation, he will receive a ‘right-to-sue’ 
letter, certifying that he has exhausted the EEOC part of the process, and may proceed to 
federal court.17 He has 90 days to do this.18   
                                                 
12 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 12 October 2000, ‘establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation’ (‘Employment Directive’). 
13 Equality (n 8 above) p 4.38.  
14 It should be noted that the UK adopted the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law through the Human Rights 
Act 1998. This will surely affect employment discrimination protection, but its impact is too unclear for a meaningful analysis 
in this paper. See, eg, RW Rideout ‘The Enforcement of Human Rights in Employment’ 52 Current Legal Problems (OUP 
Oxford 1999) 239. 
15 42 USC s 2000e-5(e). 
16 The states generally have their own anti-discrimination laws and enforcement agencies. In recognition of this fact, the 
original 180-day limitation period for the federal statutes was extended to 300 days in those states that have their own 
recognized investigative enforcement agency. In the few states where a putative plaintiff has only the EEOC, she must file 
within 180 days. An explanation of this eccentric system exceeds the scope of this article. 
17 See The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission An Evaluation of the EEOC Mediation Program (EEOC 
www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/chapter4.html 1999) (‘EEOC Mediation’). 
  According to the EEOC’s own report on its procedures, leaving the charge with 
EEOC for investigation will yield one of three results: (1) a finding of no reasonable 
cause to believe discrimination has occurred; (2) a finding that reasonable cause exists, 
and conciliation should be pursued; or (3) a finding that reasonable cause exists, that 
conciliation should be pursued, and that, failing conciliation, the EEOC will take up the 
lawsuit itself.19 A finding of  ‘no reasonable cause’ means the claimant receives a right-
to-sue letter, and may go to federal court. Only 8.8% of charges result in a finding of 
reasonable cause, of which one fourth (2.2% of total charges) successfully conciliate; of 
the remaining 6.6%, only 0.35% become an EEOC lawsuit, and the rest receive a right-
to-sue letter.20 Thus, in the neighbourhood of 97.45% of EEOC claimants either 
withdraw their complaint or receive a right-to-sue letter. 
                                                                                                                                                
To understand why all employment discrimination claimants in the US must 
spend at least 180 days, and on average over 300 days,21 in an EEOC process which does 
little but delay the inevitable federal lawsuit in all but 2.55% of claims, requires an 
appreciation of the naiveté of the legislators who created the EEOC in the 1960s, and of 
the impact of the availability of punitive damages and a jury trial. Such an appreciation 
goes beyond what this article can provide, but suffice it to say that in 1964 the US 
Congress thought that 180 days should be plenty of time for the EEOC to investigate and 
conciliate the vast majority of claims, and that federal lawsuits would be a last resort, and 
generally would be prosecuted by the EEOC, not the injured employee.22 Indeed, 
Congress hotly debated whether to give the EEOC quasi-judicial authority, in order to 
increase access to remedies and speed resolution of disputes, but the majority consciously 
decided to entrust the courts with the final say, limiting the EEOC’s remedial power to 
that of filing lawsuits on behalf of the aggrieved.23   
The EEOC has never received enough money to do this job, and since the 1960s 
the legislature has (1) increased the time to file a charge, (2) assigned responsibility for 
all employment discrimination statutes (ADEA, ADA, EPA, Title VII) to the EEOC, and 
(3) added encouragements to litigation such as jury awards of punitive damages. This has 
left the EEOC with a hopeless backlog for decades, and led the EEOC to divide charges 
into three classes: (1) a tiny minority of high-profile cases targeted for litigation; (2) the 
largest group of cases, considered weak, and left to languish until the 180 day period 
expires; and (3) cases with some apparent merit, referred to mediation, and investigated 
only where the mediation fails.24 For 97.45% of employment discrimination claimants, 
this means a six-month to one-year delay and the right, after it all, to embark on a lawsuit 
in federal court. 
 
18 42 USC s 2000e-5(f)(1). 
19 EEOC Mediation (n 17 above). 
20 In 2000 EEOC received 79,896 charges of discrimination and filed 291 lawsuits. The US Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission Statistics for All Statutes FY 1992-FY2000 (EEOC www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html 2001); The US Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 1999 (EEOC 
www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html 2001). 
21 EEOC Mediation (n 17 above). 
22 See EEOC Mediation (n 17 above); 2 [1964] US Cong & Adm News 2404, 2515-16. 
23 2 [1964] US Cong & Adm News 2515-16 (‘the Commission must confine its activities to correcting abuse, not promoting 
equality’). 
24 See EEOC Mediation (n 17 above); Equality (n 8 above) p 4.26. 
Before the introduction of jury trials, the average time for litigating an 
employment discrimination case was about 14 months, not including one or two years for 
EEOC proceedings, and ten percent of cases took more than three years, not counting 
appeals.25 Proceedings (with the exception of EEOC investigations) have taken 
dramatically more time since the advent of jury trials.26 Litigation in federal court today 
involves active case management, a pre-discovery settlement meeting, and full blown 
discovery, sometimes in stages.27 Most federal judges have another settlement meeting 
before receiving, or ruling on, motions for summary judgment.28  
Summary judgment has become increasingly popular in the federal courts to help 
clear up case backlogs.29 One who moves for summary judgment claims that there are no 
material facts in dispute, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
without findings of fact by a jury.30 Although it is next to impossible to prove a causal 
relationship, summary judgment is on the rise in employment discrimination cases after 
the 1991 addition of jury trials. For instance, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, the federal appeals court responsible for an area covering several states and 
including Chicago, Illinois, reported that in 1992 published appeals from employment 
discrimination cases were roughly half from trials and half from summary judgment; in 
1995 there were two summary judgment appeals for every one trial appeal, and by 1996 
there were four summary judgment appeals for every one from a trial. Whether it flows 
from the influence of jury trials, punitive damages, or some other source, summary 
judgment has become (1) an essential stage in almost all federal employment 
discrimination litigation, and (2) a focus for settlement efforts, either by negotiation, 
mediation, or some other means. 
Plaintiffs who successfully run the summary judgment gauntlet tend to win more 
often than defendants, and more often before juries than before judges (or arbitrators).31 
They usually receive high (by UK standards) punitive and compensatory damages from 
juries (a mean of $417,178 and a median of $106,500), usually with uncapped state 
damages added on.32 Costs to litigants are frequently greater than $50,000 per party, and 
                                                 
25 See RA Bales ‘The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a 
Proposed Reconciliation’ 77 Boston University L Rev 687 (1997). 
26 See D Sherwyn, JB Tracey, & ZJ Eigen ‘In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the  
Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process’ 2 U Pa J Lab & Emp L 73, 97-98 (1999) 
(‘Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen’); SB Burbank & LJ Silberman ‘Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: the United 
States of America’ 45 AJCL 675 (1997) (‘Burbank & Silberman’); HR Rep No 487, 105th Cong, 2nd Sess, 1998 (1998 WL 
191267); M Mankes ‘Combating Individual Employment Discrimination in the United States and Great Britain: a Novel 
Remedial Approach’ 16 Comp Lab L J 67, 82-83 (1994) (‘Mankes’). 
27 Fed R Civ P 26-37. 
28 Fed R Civ P 56. The motion for summary judgment is now called ‘motion for judgment as a matter of law’ under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
29 See D Goldian ‘New Reason to Lie: the End of Proving Discriminatory Intent by Proving Pretext Only After St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v Hicks’ 30 Willamette L Rev 699, 717-719 (1994); PW Mollica ‘Employment Discrimination Cases in the 7th 
Circuit’ 1 Empl Rights & Empl Pol’y J 63, 76-79 (1998).  
30 Fed R Civ P 56.  
31 See Mankes (n 26 above) 84; KVW Stone ‘Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employee Rights Cases: the Yellow Dog 
Contract of the 1990s’ 73 Denver L Rev 1017 (1996) (‘Stone’); KM Clermont & T Eisenberg ‘Trial By Jury or Judge’ 77 
Cornell L Rev 1124, 1135 (1992); SH Bompey & MP Pappas ‘Is there a Better Way? Compulsory Arbitration of Employment 
Discrimination Claims after Gilmer’ 19 Empl Rel L J No 3, 208 (1993-1994) (‘Bompey & Pappas’). 
32 See Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above) 141; Mankes (n 26 above) 84-5; J Dertouzos, E Holland, & P Ebener The Legal 
and Economic Consequences of Wrongful Termination (Rand 1988); GD Newman ‘The Model Employment Termination Act 
in the United States: Lessons from the British Experience with Uniform Protections Against Unfair Dismissal’ 27 Stanford J 
Int’l L 393 (1991); 2 [1991] US Cong & Adm News 676-82. 
the average plaintiff’s lawyer requires a retainer of $3,000 to $3,600 and a 35% 
contingent fee to take a case.33 Thus, the typical US employment discrimination plaintiff 
spends a year waiting for the EEOC, three months finding a lawyer to take her case,34 
and either a year in litigation ending in an utter defeat at summary judgment, or a year or 
two in litigation leading to a trial. The first formal airing of the US plaintiff’s case 
happens as much as three (or more) years after filing an EEOC claim, or never. 
e 
industr
 Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998, sought to 
streaml
                                                
4. THE UK PROCEDURAL SYSTEM FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Complaints of employment discrimination in the UK are made to the ‘employment 
tribunals.’ Until 1971 the tribunals, called ‘industrial tribunals,’ handled a small range of 
matters such as entitlement to assessments from the Industrial Training Act 1964, or 
payments under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.35 The Industrial Relations Act 
1971 introduced the cause of action for unfair dismissal, and gave jurisdiction of such 
claims to the tribunals. In time the tribunals were given jurisdiction over equal pay 
claims, sex discrimination claims, race discrimination claims, and now disability claims. 
The decision to give essentially all individual (as opposed to collective) employment 
matters to the tribunals drew in great part from the ‘Donovan Report,’ which hailed the 
tribunals, as it saw them in 1968, as ‘easily accessible, informal, speedy, and 
inexpensive.’36 The tribunals consist of a Chairman,37 who is legally trained, and more 
specifically trained to handle employment matters, and two lay members with som
38ial experience.    
The tribunals were largely viewed as successful, although by the 1980s there were 
complaints that procedure before the tribunals had increased in formality and legalism.39 
In the mid-1990s complaints arose of backlogs in the London area tribunals (but not 
elsewhere) to the effect that ‘only’ 54% of London cases were resolved at a tribunal 
hearing within 26 weeks of filing a claim.40 As a result, the Employment Tribunals Act 
1996, followed by the
ine the system. 
The 1998 Act changed the name of the tribunals to ‘employment’ tribunals, 
provided for new circumstances in which a Chairman can act without the lay members, 
and introduced measures to promote alternative means of dispute resolution.41 Presently, 
a claim is filed on a form which a plaintiff can fill in by hand; this she must do within 
three months for most forms of discrimination, two years for EqPA.42 The case is then 
 
33 Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above) 81, 99-100; see also Burbank & Silberman (n 26 above); C Summers ‘Remedies for 
Employment Rights’ 141 U Pa L Rev 457, 486 (1991). 
34 A tall order given that she will either need to come up with tens of thousands of dollars or have a case good enough to 
convince an attorney that, say, one third of the recovery after trial will exceed $40,000. See Burbank & Silberman (n 26 
above) 691, n 74 (noting that personal injury lawyers in the US have begun turning away cases worth less than $100,000). 
35 See MacMillan (n 9 above) 34-5; BJ Doyle Employment Tribunals (Jordans Bristol 1998) p 1.1.1-3 (‘Employment 
Tribunals’). 
36 MacMillan (n 9 above) 34-5; Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) 1.1.2-5; L Dickens, M Jones, B Weekes, & M Hart 
Dismissed (Blackwell Oxford 1985) 276-7 (‘Dismissed’); Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations 1965-1968 (Cmnd 3623) (London, 1968: HMSO). 
37 There are recommendations before Parliament to render the title gender-neutral (eg ‘employment judge’). Equality (n 8 
above) p 4.11. 
38 Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) p 3.3.1. 
39 Dismissed (n 36 above) 194-200. 
40 MacMillan (n 9 above) 46, n 45. 
41 Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) p 1.3.1-6. 
42 Eg SDA § 76; EqPA § 2(5). 
referred to the Advisory, Conciliation, and Arbitration Service (ACAS) for possible 
conciliation. ACAS does not investigate as the EEOC is supposed to do, but immediately 
begins a process of conciliation, which is a kind of shuttle diplomacy where the ACAS 
advisor tries to avoid evaluating the parties’ positions, but encourages compromise and 
concess
that the
S successfully conciliated 44%, 31% were withdrawn, 
and 25%
                                                
ions, to the end of supervising a settlement.  
The UK does have investigative agencies, the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOC) for sex discrimination and the Commission on Racial Equality (CRE) for race 
discrimination, which can support claimants in litigating their claims, but claimants are 
not required to go through these agencies, and they generally play a minor role in 
providing remedies to individual employees.43 Instead, the agencies tend to focus on their 
powers to issue codes of practice, perform studies, and make recommendations or 
reports. They also have powers to make formal investigations and issue 
‘nondiscrimination orders,’ but these do not relate to specific disputes, but to ongoing 
employer practices, and carry no award of damages. Whether the activities of the EOC 
and CRE more effectively combat employment discrimination than do awards of 
damages to aggrieved employees falls outside the ambit of this comparison, but it is clear 
y do not affect the dispute resolution process to the extent of the EEOC or ACAS. 
If a case does not settle through ACAS conciliation, many interlocutory matters 
can come before a chairman alone, and the parties may (although this is rarely done) 
submit their case for a resolution without a hearing. Cases are tried on fairly basic 
discovery, and the tribunal conducts an informal hearing by US federal court standards, 
sometimes playing an inquisitorial role where parties are unrepresented, in an otherwise 
adversarial procedure.44 It is too early to measure the effects of the 1998 Act, but even at 
the time it came into effect, outside of London some 85% of cases resolved by a tribunal 
hearing were finished within 26 weeks;45 the average award of damages in 2000-2001 
was ₤11,024 for sex discrimination, ₤12,978 for disability discrimination, and ₤15,484 
for race discrimination.46 The average cost to each litigant is less than 1000 pounds, 
borne by each party.47 In the fifteen month period from 1 April 1999 to 30 June 2000, the 
tribunals and ACAS received 17,329 employment discrimination cases (including equal 
pay); of all of these cases, ACA
 went to the tribunals.48 
The process for resolving EqPA cases contrasts with this rosy picture of speedy 
remedies. UK protection against unequal pay for work of ‘equal value’ (like ‘comparable 
worth’ in the US) generally involves referral to an independent expert.49 The independent 
expert provides an opinion, on which the tribunal relies, as to whether the claimant’s job 
carries equal value to that of the chosen comparators. This process of course takes time. 
 
43 See Equality (n 8 above) p 4.35; NR Lipper ‘Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: a Comparative Study of Great Britain 
and the United States’ 13 Comp Lab L J 293 (1992); M MacEwan ‘Promoting Equal Opportunity: the Role of the Regulatory 
Agency in Racial Discrimination’ 1 Int’l J of Disc & L 39 (1995). 
44 Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) ch 3; Mankes (n 26 above) 92-93; MacMillan (n 9 above) 37-44. 
45 MacMillan (n 9 above) 45-46; Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) p 1.1.4 (‘The author’s experience suggests that, outside 
London, cases are coming on so quickly for trial that many legal representatives are unprepared for trial’). 
46 Employment Tribunals Service Annual Report for year ending 31 March 2001 . 
47 MacMillan (n 9 above); 47; ACAS Annual Report, 1999-2000 (ACAS Leicester 2000) (‘ACAS’). Other sources have placed 
it between ₤1250 and ₤2500 for an employer-respondent.  R Lewis & J Clark ‘Arbitration in Dismissal Disputes: the ACAS 
Scheme’ (www.industriallawsociety.org.uk/lewisclark.htm 2000). 
48 See ACAS (n 47 above) app 1, table 8. 
49 Equality (n 8 above) p 4.27. Tribunals may decide the issue themselves in easier cases. EqPA s 2A(1)(a). 
In 1998-99, the median time for completion of an equal value case in the UK was 17 
months.50 According to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, such delay is ‘properly 
described as scandalous and amount[s] to a denial of justice to women through the 
judicial process.’51 This scandalous process nevertheless takes less time and expense than 
the US system where parties must hire their own experts—which often involves a ‘battle 
of the experts’ ultimately resolved by a jury—or simply fail to meet the very difficult 
burden
ages, and 
 employment discrimination, and ACAS conciliation hardly merits 
the nam
 of proving comparable worth.52 
Compared with the ACAS/tribunal system, the US system imposes vastly greater 
costs in both time and money on litigants. In the UK a claimant (except in an EqPA case) 
can realistically expect to present her case to an expert tribunal within six months of 
filing her claim (which must happen within three months of the alleged grievance) and, if 
she prevails, collect a modest, four-figure award. US claimants struggle through the 
system for a time UK tribunals would call ‘scandalous’ and a ‘denial of justice,’ probably 
followed by abject defeat on summary judgment, but possibly leading, after three years of 
process, to $300,000 in pain and suffering, $300,000 in punitive dam
unspecified state damages, making a major public statement into the bargain. 
5. ADR IN THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Against the backdrop of the systems described above, Parliament has introduced the 
Employment Rights (Dispute Resolution) Act 1998 in the UK, and Congress enacted the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 in the US. Although the timing and names of 
the acts suggest an eerie coincidence, the statutes do very different things, and enter onto 
ADR landscapes which have developed along distinct lines. For example, while ADR is 
used in the UK in international business settings, to resolve construction disputes and, 
less commonly, in collective labour disputes,53 arbitration54 and mediation play almost 
no role whatsoever in
e ‘alternative.’   
Contrast this with the US, where the area of employment discrimination has seen 
increased use of mediation and negotiation, and the proliferation of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements, often entered into as part of the consideration for employment.55 
Some courts have actually employed court-annexed arbitration, although this is rare; most 
courts use court-ordered mediation, or aggressive, settlement-oriented case 
management.56 The EEOC tries to refer half of its charges to mediation under its in-house 
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ent Tribunals (n 35 above) p 4.5.1; N Speechly ‘Talkin’ ‘Bout a Resolution’ 67 The In-
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52 Equality (n 8 above) p 4.31. 
53 See ACAS (n 47 above); Employm
House Lawyer 16 (February 1999). 
54 Although some insist that arbitration falls outside the rubric of ADR owing to its adjudicative character,
ADR technique in light of its role as an alternative to the formal procedural mechanisms. 
55 See EEOC Mediation (n 17 above); Stone (n 31 above); SA Fitzgibbon ‘After Gardner-Denver, Gilmer, and Wright: the 
Supreme Court’s Next Arbitration Decision’ 44 St. Louis U L J 833 (2000) (‘Fitzgibbon’); J Waters ‘Does the Battle Over 
Mandatory Arbitration Jeopardize the EEOC’s War  in Fighting Workplace Discrimination?’ 44 St. Louis U L J 1155 (2
(‘Waters’); TC Bailey ‘Reconciling Alexander and Gilmer: Explaining the Continued Vitality of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. in the Context of Collective Bargaining Agreements’ 43 St. Louis U L J 219 (1999) (‘Bailey’); Task Force on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes 
Arising out of the Employment Relationship (www.adr.org/rules/emp  1995) (‘Due Process Protocol’). 
 Sess, 1998 (1998 WL 191267). 56 HR Rep No 487, 105th Cong, 2nd
mediation program.57 A US employment discrimination plaintiff could literally 
experience (1) EEOC mediation, (2) EEOC conciliation, (3) negotiation upon filing suit, 
(4) court-ordered mediation, (5) more negotiation, this time with a judge serving as a 
neutral mediator/conciliator, (6) voluntary court-annexed non-binding arbitration, and (7) 
appeal mediation, all in the same case.  This writer has litigated cases which involved (1) 
through (5).  This gives one the impression, as an academic and as an advocate who has 
represented employers and employees in US employment discrimination matters, that 
participants in the US system―parties, their attorneys, and the courts―are desperate for 
some w
 forms according to the aims of 
rced to require that an employee submit 
discrim 59
                                                
ay out of the time, expense, and frustration of the formal system. 
The next three sections will look in turn at pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
the US, post-dispute ADR in the US, and ADR use in the UK. The kinds of ADR thet 
feature primarily in these sections are arbitration, mediation and conciliation. Although 
these techniques find expression in various forms, the following discussion will benefit 
from a general typology. Arbitration refers to the submission of a dispute, usually under a 
contract between the parties, to an independent, private person (or panel of persons) for 
adjudication. The arbitrator (or arbitrators) is usually experienced in the field from which 
the dispute arises, and often has legal training. Arbitration is almost always binding on 
the parties, but this depends on the contract under which the dispute is submitted to 
arbitration, as do the process and standards for selecting the arbitrator or panel.  
Mediation involves an agreement by the parties to employ a third person, also usually 
legally trained and having some experience with the class of case to be mediated, to assist 
in the negotiation of a settlement. The mediator often gives the parties an opportunity to 
state their case to each other, before separating them and engaging in a process of 
conveying proposals between the parties whilst helping to educate them about the 
strengths and weaknesses of their cases.  Finally, conciliation is essentially mediation 
performed by an official intermediary, and takes different
the officials (for these purposes, the EEOC and ACAS).   
6. PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE US 
Potential defendants in the US sometimes choose ADR even before a dispute arises, 
using pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements (‘PMAAs’). These are contracts, 
generally at the inception of a relationship (either an employment, collective bargaining, 
or a licensing relationship), and often in consideration for employment, which require the 
submission to binding arbitration of all disputes arising out of the relationship.58 US 
courts have held that such agreements can be enfo
ination claims to binding arbitration.      
The arbitration required by PMAAs generally involves a single arbitrator (some 
call for three), selected according to a procedure set out in the arbitration agreement. 
 
ration for Discrimination Claims’ 31 
 
 
992); Cook v Barratt 
57 EEOC Mediation (n 17 above). 
58 MZ Green ‘Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From Using Mandatory Arbit
Rutgers L J 399, 400-421 (2000) (‘Green’); Bompey & Pappas (n 31 above) 198-201.  
59Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnston Lane 500 US 20 (1991) (‘Gilmer’). The decision addressed a licensing, not an employment,
contract and explicitly avoided the question of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC s 1) allows the enforcement of 
PMAAs in employment agreements. However, lower appellate courts have enforced PMAAs in employment contracts, and the
Supreme Court has not intervened. See, eg, Mago v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc 956 F2d 932 (9th Cir 1
Am, Inc 219 Cal App 3d 1004, 268 Cal Rptr 629 (4th App Dist 1990) cert denied 111 SCt 2052 (1991). 
Discovery is informal, although arbitrators generally have subpoena authority.60 The 
hearing can take place within a month or two of submission, takes a day on average (but 
can take two or three), and is often followed by the submission of written briefs within a 
month of the hearing. A decision, usually based on a written opinion, should issue within 
a month. The entire process can take less than six months (264 days has been quoted as 
an average), and costs less than court litigation, especially where a party proceeds 
without counsel.61 Arbitration is generally considered final, and not subject to meaningful 
judicial
yee-side PMAA supporters also explain that arbitration can 
incorpo
bstantive standards.  The courts presently forbid an arbitration agreement or 
award t
 review under the Federal Arbitration Act, except for fraud, drunkenness, or 
exceeding authority under the arbitration agreement.62   
The proponents of enforcing PMAAs, often strange bedfellows, focus on the need 
for quick, cheap, quiet, and, overall, accessible resolution. Supporters from the 
employee/plaintiff camp point to the fact that the formal process (lengthy EEOC, lengthy 
federal process, prohibitive expense) provides no real forum at all.63 They claim the 
appropriate comparison is not between arbitration and a big, happy federal trial with a 
gullible jury and lots of judicially enforced procedural protections, but between 
arbitration and never finding a lawyer to take the case, or getting squashed on summary 
judgment, or languishing in the system until accepting a nuisance settlement seems the 
only way out.64 The emplo
rate sensitivity to the unique issues arising in an industrial setting better than any 
generalist federal judge.65   
Their fellow travellers, the employers, claim that while arbitration may afford 
every plaintiff a forum, and might mean more individual awards, the awards will not 
approach the numbers federal juries give, attorney’s fees will be kept low, and the cases 
will stay out of the papers.66 Both employer and employee-side supporters agree, 
however, that arbitration must provide whichever procedural safeguards are most 
important to that party.67 Several organizations and academics, sympathetic to the rights 
of aggrieved employees to the processes intended by the various statutes, object to 
enforcement of PMAAs unless they comply with an agreed ‘Due Process Protocol,’ 
which guarantees several court-like procedural protections, and the application of 
statutory su 68
o divest them of jurisdiction unless statutory remedies and minimal procedures are 
assured.69 
On the other side of the debate are the EEOC and another faction sympathetic to 
employees. They are concerned that compulsory arbitration deprives the EEOC of its 
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61 Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26
62 9 USC s 10. 
63 Fitzgibbon (n 55 above); Mankes (n 26 above); Green (n 58 above). 
64 See Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above). 
65 Fitzgibbon (n 55 above). 
66 Green (n 58 above)
67 See, eg, Due Process Protoco
68 See Due Process Protocol (n 55 above); National Academy of Arbitrators ‘Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory Claims 
under Employer-Promulgated Systems’ (www.naarb.org/guidelines.html 1997); Fitzgibbon (n 55 above); Bailey (n 55 abo
Green (n 58 above). 
69 Gilmer (n 59 above) 30-32. 
ve); 
opportunity to punish the bad guys and strike a blow for change.70 The argument is that 
the whole point of the statutes, and of the fact that they require resort to an enforcement 
agency like the EEOC, federal lawsuits, juries, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees for 
successful plaintiffs, is to allow first the EEOC, and then certain particularly aggrieved 
citizens, to make a statement, and discourage discriminatory conduct nationwide.71 
According to this theory, arbitration cannot possibly accomplish what Congress intended, 
ployers money, and it does provide access even 
 
program
g dissatisfied parties can bring an arbitrated case back to court for 
a new t
arguments for the 
defenda
for the very reasons that it does save em
to small claims. 
7. POST-DISPUTE ADR IN THE US 
While some participants like the idea of substituting arbitration for litigation before a 
dispute arises, very seldom, if at all, do parties opt to arbitrate an employment 
discrimination claim after the initiation of a lawsuit or EEOC charge.72 Indeed, 
arbitration seems to have few supporters once the system has been set in motion. For 
example, the EEOC has recently instituted a mediation program, but not an arbitration
. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (ADRA) provides for 
compulsory mediation, but not arbitration.73 Why is arbitration a good idea before a 
dispute arises, but not after? 
The answer, of course, depends upon which participant you ask. Courts appear to 
be warming to arbitration, and will enforce PMAAs which meet certain criteria. This, like 
the rising stock of summary judgment, may relate to increased pressure to clear 
overcrowded court caseloads. Congress, as evidenced by the ADRA, appears unwilling to 
thrust arbitration on parties not bound by a PMAA. ADRA now requires all federal courts 
to institute some kind of court-annexed ADR, including non-binding arbitration, 
mediation, early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trials (many have been doing so 
since 1990). However, binding arbitration does not feature in ADRA or any federal court 
ADR program, meanin
rial.74 Leaving arbitration non-binding reflects Congress’s hesitance to undermine 
the remedial objectives of the statutes, and preference for leaving people to choose 
whether to arbitrate.   
Employers generally choose not to. They have a stake in the full US process: 
delay, the EEOC-court-appeal hierarchy, and the expense of full-blown litigation all work 
to pressure the plaintiff into a smaller settlement.75 Summary judgment is the employer’s 
friend, allowing him to impose an expensive discovery and summary judgment defence 
workload on the plaintiff’s attorneys, and out-lawyer the other side before her story has a 
chance emotionally to affect a fact-finder. Arbitrators are known to give ‘compromise’ 
awards, sympathizing with the plaintiff despite compelling legal 
nt.76 Moreover, statistics demonstrate that arbitrators are more plaintiff-friendly 
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73 28 USC ss 652(a), 65
74 28 USC s 657(c). 
75 Green (n 58 above); Fitzgibbon (n 55 a
76 Bompey & Pappas (n
than judges.77 In short, if the employer believes the plaintiff’s case is weak (which is 
most of the time), it will view arbitration as taking its weapons away. 
Given employers’ general aversion, employees naturally want to sign up for 
arbitration, right? Evidently not. Arbitrators, while finding for plaintiffs more often than 
judges, seldom award punitive damages and generally award smaller amounts, and find 
for defendants more often, than juries.78 The average plaintiff must find an attorney to 
take a case on a contingent fee or ‘no-win no-pay’ basis. Modest awards do not make for 
healthy contingent fees.79 Discrimination is hard to prove: attorneys must eschew cases 
where if they win, they will only receive the market value for their time. Therefore, even 
the red
t to a choice for arbitration, but they are chosen from a state 
of igno
chosen
 benefits of mediation spill beyond the reach of this piece, but some of those 
benefits ex
Contin
point: 
solve the claim. … If it is a case with a real liability exposure, 
pre
ent before suit at a fraction of the cost of 
litig
                                                
uced costs of arbitration must be balanced against the need to get a large award to 
cover fees. A plaintiff proceeding without an attorney would almost certainly benefit 
from an arbitral alternative, but if the plaintiff proposes arbitration, what employer would 
agree, and pass up a chance to out-lawyer an unrepresented claimant?    
When parties have a case in front of them, and compare the tools they have to get 
their way in federal court to the tools afforded by arbitration, at least one of them rejects 
arbitration.80 PMAAs amoun
rance about the strength or weakness of the potential case. Once people actually 
know what they have, the siren songs of punitive damages (in a strong case) or of 
opportunities for delay and pressure (in a weak case) seem to blot the benefits of 
arbitration from the mind.   
Mediation, on the other hand, is clearly the ADR darling of US employment 
discrimination law. The EEOC, representing the interests of aggrieved employees, has 
 mediation over arbitration.81 Federal court-annexed mediation schemes almost 
always ear-mark employment discrimination cases as ‘appropriate for mediation.’82 The 
myriad
plain why it plays such a large role in US employment discrimination disputes. 
The following excerpt, from a paper presented at an American Bar Association 
uing Legal Education Seminar on mediation in employment law, illustrates the 
Given the cost of litigating even a ‘winning’ case … consideration should be 
given in every [discrimination] claim whether a pre-litigation mediation may be 
the best way to re
-litigation mediation makes sense if for no other reason than to avoid the costs 
of defense and, in discrimination cases, plaintiff’s counsel. Even a weak 
plaintiff’s case may be open to settlem
ating to win. 
 
77 Stone (n 31 above). 
78 Stone (n 31 above); Mankes (n 26 above); Bompey & Pappas (n 31 above) 208; Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above) 140-
141. 
79 Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above) 99-100. 
80 Sherwin, Tracy, & Eigen (n 26 above) 129-130. 
81 EEOC Mediation (n 17 above). 
82 MS Rudy & LM Guerin ‘An Employment Lawyer’s Guide to Mediation’ ABA CLE Seminar Documents, San Francisco, 
October 9, 1998, 640-644 (‘Rudy & Guerin’). 
The employer should have a sense of the plaintiff’s intestinal fortitude: will 
she (or he) really want to go through depositions, etc. or will the claimant take a 
low-ball offer to avoid discovery? … 
Will your client, who insists on fighting on principle now, feel the same way 
$100,000 i  dn efense costs into the case? … 
otions for Summary Judgment are expensive. … However, they are also 
that ‘re
, and informal 
procedu
                                                
M
expensive high-stakes gambles for plaintiffs. If discovery has gone well and a 
plausible summary judgment threat can be made, plaintiff may be motivated to 
settle at a figure appealing to the defense to avoid the risk of summary 
judgment.83 
 
Although the foregoing expresses the strategic considerations of an employer’s counsel, it 
demonstrates the kind of attitude that attorneys on both sides take to mediation. They see 
it as a flexible, tactical tool, ready for use when the tide of battle dictates. Some counsel 
use it simply to educate clients about weaknesses in the case, or to learn about the 
opponent’s evidence and approach.84 
Mediation in the US employment discrimination field generally involves what the 
UK would call evaluative, facilitative mediation. Unlike ACAS conciliation, which 
remains neutral and simply helps the parties understand each other’s positions, a US 
mediator provides a sense of a forum for expressing grievances, as well as evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ cases. Unlike EEOC conciliation, which assumes 
asonable cause’ has been found and advocates a specific settlement, a mediator 
attempts to effectuate the wishes of the parties, while telling them what is realistic, and 
perhaps making recommendations for what concessions would yield counter-
concessions.85 The mediation takes place in person (both ACAS and EEOC conciliation 
often take place over the phone),86 and each party makes a statement, followed by the 
parties retiring to separate rooms, and the mediator essentially shuttling between the two.   
The most attractive attribute of mediation is its non-binding nature.87 The parties 
can get the things the scholars tell us they would get from arbitration: quick and easy 
access to a forum, a resolution without excessive delay and expense
res. If they do not like where the mediation takes them, they can withdraw and 
proceed with formal litigation. Of course, the obvious downsides to mediation include 
resolutions which compromise what some consider categorical principles and, in many 
cases, no resolution at all.  After months or years of draining process, however, claimants 
who began intending to vindicate their rights appear willing to accept five or six figures 
in exchange for letting their employer avoid any finding of wrongdoing.  
Thus US litigants demonstrate their frustration with how the formal system works 
by reaching for mediation and similar techniques (judge-assisted negotiations, early 
 
83 J Parton (III) & J Lau ‘Making a Settlement Stick’ ABA CLE Seminar Documents, San Francisco, October 9, 1998, 585, 
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85 ADR Principles (n 60 above) 277-293. 
86 ADR Principles (n 60 above) 77-78, 273-280. 
87 See Rudy & Guerin (n 82 above). 
neutral evaluation), but they will not reach all the way and opt for binding arbitration 
 
 
b ACAS, or made privately with assistance from a ‘relevant independent 
advisor
ations resulting in either settlement or withdrawal of complaints.94 It has 
been s
the 1998 Act introduced a new arbitration alternative for non-collective disputes. In part 
 complaints of excessive formality and 
(which will surely resolve the case) except before they have a real dispute before them.
The courts and Congress appear happy to encourage these options rather than expensively
to reform either the federal court system or employment discrimination law. In the end, a 
system which does not give participants what they want remains intact, but festooned 
with ‘alternatives,’ which are simply ways out of the nightmare that is US civil litigation. 
 
8. UK USE OF ADR TO RESOLVE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
The employment discrimination system in the UK has seen almost no use of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements, and much less resort to mediation.88 Arbitration has seldom been 
used because the race, sex, and now disability statutes have forbidden any arbitration 
agreement from divesting the employment tribunals of jurisdiction.89 In fact, no 
agreement may effect a prior waiver of employment discrimination protections, and once 
a claimant invokes the jurisdiction of the tribunals, no agreement, except one brokered 
and approved y 
,’ can oust the tribunals of jurisdiction.90 Prior to the recent arbitral alternative for 
unfair dismissal cases, ACAS had no authority to settle individual cases through 
arbitration. Thus the only experience most employers and employees have of arbitration 
comes from an arbitration service that ACAS has offered on a voluntary, non-binding 
basis, and used almost exclusively for collective disputes, or for individual claims in a 
union setting.91   
Mediation is a word seldom seen in UK employment discrimination literature, 
probably owing to the fact that ACAS conciliation, which is much like simple facilitative 
mediation, has completely occupied the field. US-style mediation has been urged,92 but 
not stridently, as this would involve paying extra to a neutral to do what ACAS does on 
public funds, except with a greater degree of case evaluation by the neutral. When ACAS 
receives a case, it opens negotiations between the parties and works for a settlement 
while adhering to a strict principle of neutrality.93 ACAS has a high success rate, with 
75% of concili
uggested that this success rate owes something to the fact that access to the 
employment tribunals is geographically difficult, and claimants accept settlements or 
withdraw complaints to avoid travel.  It should be noted that this factor applies equally to 
US federal courts and EEOC offices, which are often hundreds of miles apart.  Whatever 
the reasons, UK litigants do not clamour for mediation-style alternatives to ACAS 
conciliation.   
In addition to changes aimed at streamlining the actual process of the Tribunals, 
because the new option arose in response to
                                                 
88 ADR Principles (n 60 above) 273-280. 
89 Employment Rights Act 1996 s 203; Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) p 5.2.7. 
 also offers ‘advisory mediation’ in connection with collective disputes. 
90 Employment Tribunals (n 35 above) p 5.2.11. 
91 ACAS (n 47 above) app 1-3. ACAS
92 Equality (n 8 above) 4.59-4.65. 
93 See Dismissed (n 36 above); Equality (n 8 above). 
94 ACAS (n 47 above) app 1, table 8. 
legalism in the tribunals, the arbitration alternative involves arbitration of the kind 
traditionally employed by ACAS in resolving industrial disputes, relying only on the rule 
of industrial fairness in a discharge, not on substantive legal principles.95 This kind of 
arbitration probably will not suit discrimination claims, with increasingly
96
 legalistic, 
burden
 be subject to challenge before the European Court 
of Just
went the way of the US 
Due Pr
                                                
-shifting frameworks for remediation.  The Act provided for prompt 
implementation of an ACAS-contrived scheme for arbitration of unfair dismissal 
complaints, and allowed for a subsequent order, by a secretary of state, that ACAS 
prepare a program of arbitration for claims like employment discrimination.   
This has not occurred as yet, and according to ACAS will not occur in the near 
future.97 Arbitration is not an option which the UK is necessarily free to employ, because 
soon all UK employment discrimination law will be backed-up by EC law, which can 
limit the UK’s freedom to improvise remedies.  For example, in 1988 a UK tribunal held 
that EC law prohibited the imposition of an upper limit on sex discrimination damages 
(no longer in effect in the UK), in that it failed to deliver the deterrent effect 
contemplated by EC discrimination protections.98 EC directives already dictate burdens 
of proof, and could go beyond that to dictate procedure. At present the concern is that the 
an informal arbitral alternative could
ice as inconsistent with enforcement of the substantive rights guaranteed by the 
Race Directive and Employment Directive. Any alternative will probably require 
something like an American-style arbitration, taking six months and costing as much as, 
or more than, a tribunal proceeding. 
Participants in the UK system appear to want change, pointing specifically to 
excessive legal formality and, surprisingly from a US perspective, delay and expense. 
However, there is little evidence that delay remains a persistent problem except in EqPA 
claims, and no time would be saved by an arbitration scheme that 
ocess Protocol. Arbitration could only save money if it reduced legalism and 
formality to the point that lawyers, discovery, and other expensive parts of the process 
disappeared. This seems unlikely to suit any party to a discrimination claim, and 
solicitors who practise in the field say they would not advise it.99 
A recent poll of employers found that only half would likely use the new ACAS 
arbitration scheme, because they hoped it would take less time and be cheaper.100 But the 
entire article in which the survey appeared, an IRS Employment Trends special feature on 
new ADR developments, made no mention of arbitration for discrimination claims. The 
Confederation of British Industry makes it very clear, in a statement from its Human 
Resources Directorate to its members, that it favours the new scheme ‘for the cases most 
 
7 (www.parliament.the-stationery-95 Lords Hansard Text for 25 July 1997 and 21 October 199
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shire AHA (No 2) [1988] IRLR 325 (Southampton Industrial Tribunal) (held 
 76/207 as interpreted by 
e) p 5.4.1. 
es ‘Conciliation and Arbitration’ 719 IRS Employment Rev 4 (2001). 
98 Marshall v Southampton and Southwest Hamp
that the statutory limit under s65 of the Sex Discrimination Act was contrary to art 6 of EC Directive
the European Court in Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case 14/83)). 
99 Employment Tribunals (n 35 abov
100 Industrial Relations Servic
appropriate for this approach – relatively straightforward unfair dismissal cases.’101 One 
study suggests that employers are happy with the present system for employment 
discrimination, and fear they would ‘lose control’ (read: ‘lose substantive legal standards, 
discovery, and other procedural safeguards’) in arbitration.102 The same study concluded 
that arbitration would not diminish EqPA delays, and dismissed the need for arbitration 
of othe
l matter, participants in the system do not call for arbitration of 
ination cases; even the reception of the unfair dismissal scheme is 
verwhelmingly appealing. The UK civil court system as a 
whole i
and (2
r employment discrimination cases because, ‘[u]nlike the USA, where the cost and 
delays of civil litigation have stimulated the use of arbitration in discrimination cases, 
there is no reason to suppose that arbitration in the UK will be speedier or more cost-
effective for the parties than the tribunals, particularly where there are complex disputes 
of fact or law.’103 
As a genera
employment discrim
lukewarm. Mediation is unlikely to do better than ACAS’s good record of facilitating 
early settlement. The combination of quick referral to ACAS and the real likelihood of a 
tribunal ruling within six months means that few alternatives appear compelling. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Although dissatisfaction with the existing formal procedure drives calls for ADR in both 
the US and the UK, complaints are more strident in the US, and areas of concern in each 
system differ. The popularity of ADR in the US stems from frustration with the official 
system, making alternatives o
s not immune to US-sized delays and costs, but these problems are not evident in 
the system for protecting against employment discrimination. The difference might result 
from the fact that the US consciously turned away from providing an easy forum for 
resolution, and chose to use the dispute resolution process as its mechanism for fighting 
employment discrimination.   
The UK decided, in enacting the SDA and then the RRA, to fight discrimination 
by (1) setting up agencies whose remit was to promote equal employment opportunities 
) creating a wholly separate means for providing remedies to wronged 
individuals.104 It is generally accepted that the remedies afforded by the tribunal system 
aim at compensation, not deterrence.105 Although another paper might address whether 
the EOC and the CRE effectively promote equal employment opportunity in the UK, it is 
clear that the tribunals and ACAS have generally provided accessible, cheap resolutions.   
The US, on the other hand, opted to combine the EEOC’s discrimination-fighting 
task with the resolution of individual disputes.106 It was assumed at the time that this 
would be consistent with individual access to justice, but access was not a separate 
priority. When this assumption proved naïve, in that most employees went without a real 
remedy while the EEOC and a few well-represented private attorneys-general struck 
blows for equality, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 appears to have confirmed the emphasis 
                                                 
101 CBI Human Resources Directorate ‘Managing a Compensation Culture: Improving Case Management in the Employment 
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on proc
most interesting product of this 
comparison. Neither the US nor the UK would likely benefit from borrowing each other’s 
employment discrimination dispute resolution methods: perhaps not ever, but certainly 
not without addressing fundamental differences in objectives. Instead, the question arises 
whether one or the other approach does a better job eliminating discrimination, and 
whether that goal would be better pursued through something altogether separate from 
the system that purports to provide access to justice. 
                                                
ess over access. The minority in the US Congress at the time of the 1991 Act 
objected that adding punitive damages and jury trials marked a change from ‘promoting 
the prompt resolution of disputes … to one of prolonged disputes and endless 
litigation.’107 Over the minority’s objection that the changes would bring about ‘a 
lawyer’s dream come true,’ Congress put its imprimatur on a system where large-scale 
litigation is the mechanism for fighting employment discrimination.    
The tension between the goals of (1) access to remedies and (2) punishing 
discrimination through the legal process, is the 
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